Elbridge Colby on the Future of American Foreign Policy

With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States emerged as the world’s sole superpower in the post-Cold War era. Those times are gone. The rise of China over the last few decades has been nothing short of remarkable. And not just in economic terms: China has increasingly been flexing its military muscles on the world stage. In other words, there is a new kid on the block. With an economic rise that shows few signs of slowing down anytime soon and a continuous military buildup, the question arises: how should U.S. foreign policy adjust to this new reality? Is China a benign actor, just looking after the economic wellbeing of its own citizens, or should it be viewed as a potential threat?

As part of the Dartmouth 2024 Election Speaker Series, Elbridge Colby was invited to share the stage with Associate Professor of Government Jennifer Lind to discuss the recent state of affairs concerning the West’s most significant rival for the foreseeable future. Under the title “Foreign Policy in light of China’s Rise: A Strategy of Denial”, Colby expressed his views on a situation that could very well reach a critical point within the next decade. 

He described the bipartisan failure over the last 25 years as the “attempt to pursue a foreign policy that is far, far too expansive for the material, political, and fiscal resources that we have available relative to the goals that we are trying to achieve”.

No single person has arguably been more important in the change of US foreign policy priorities over the last decade. Colby’s seemingly destined venture into the field of U.S. national security is perhaps a case of what Germans would call “familiäre Vorbelastung”. His grandfather, William Colby, served as Director of Central Intelligence under Nixon and Ford, and was succeeded by George H.W. Bush. After graduating from Harvard College in 2002, Colby started his career working for the Department of Defense, later serving in the Department of State and the broader intelligence community in various capacities. This included a stint with the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq in 2003. Following his graduation from Yale Law School in 2009, he worked on global strategic affairs before being appointed as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in 2017. During his time in the Trump administration, Colby was one of the key figures in crafting the 2018 National Defense Strategy. This document shifted the Department of Defense’s focus to the challenges posed first and foremost by China, followed by Russia, and stressed the importance of clearly focusing on these priorities over lesser interests. Furthermore, he co-founded the Marathon Initiative in 2019, a non-partisan research organization focusing on great power competition.

To Colby, the central question among many foreign policy debates on the right is determining the viable and proper role for the United States in the world. He observes a spectrum of views within the Republican Party, with two extremes. On the one side, there is what Colby would describe as the “primacists”. Spearheaded by prominent faces such as John Bolton and Robert Kagan, this camp believes that not only is it desirable for the United States to be the hegemon in the world, it is also viable. 

On the other extreme lies the camp of the “true isolationists”, who believe that the United States should withdraw from the world and simply mind its own business. He acknowledges there are truths on both sides: on the one hand, the US cannot simply withdraw from the world. 

This would invite an ambitious China to dominate Asia with open arms, the world’s most important region. On the other hand, the US has gotten involved in a lot of wars over the last two decades and has been overly ambitious in what it has been trying to achieve, wearing out the American people in the process. Colby sees his role as moderating between these two poles and crafting a strategy that has a plausible goal: the “balance of power”. This approach, he argues, would prevent the U.S. from being coerced by another hegemonic force while avoiding the pitfalls of unnecessary entanglements, particularly in the context of China’s rapid rise.

While he acknowledges China’s significant achievements, such as lifting millions of its citizens out of poverty, Colby emphasizes that this economic and social progress must be seen in light of the larger geopolitical implications. He argues that the United States should respect China’s accomplishments, but also recognize the potential for China to leverage its growing economic and military power in ways that could threaten global stability, particularly in Asia. Contemporary critics rightly note that China’s situation differs from that of the Cold War. Unlike the Soviet Union, China isn’t exporting a revolutionary ideology worldwide, and while the CCP seeks greater regional influence, it’s hard to envision China “crusading around the world” in pursuit of global dominance. These arguments are often cited to downplay the notion that China poses a significant threat. But the central concern, according to Colby, is not just China’s actions, but the pace and scale of its preparations to challenge U.S. influence. He believes it’s objectively and empirically clear that China is preparing for war, and argues that the U.S. must prioritize the possibility of a conflict with China precisely to prevent it from happening.

One of Colby’s main contentions is, to state it provocatively, that most folks in Washington do not understand that we live in a world of harsh choices and scarcity. And that the US needs to grapple with this fact in a realistic way. Colby contends that the best way for the U.S. to engage with China on these issues is from a position of strength, where the balance of power is maintained. He believes that if China were to become the dominant power in Asia, it could dictate terms on global issues, including technology and climate policy, influencing U.S. sovereignty in these areas. For instance, a hegemonic China could control key platforms within the social media and e-commerce domains, leading to far-reaching implications for American companies and individuals. Similarly, Colby warns that if China gains too much economic leverage, it could shape international climate agreements and policies to its advantage, leaving the U.S. with little say in how it manages its own economy and environmental strategy.

To prevent this scenario, Colby advocates for a foreign policy that prioritizes Asia, where the U.S. would focus its efforts on countering China’s ambitions. He sees this strategy as pragmatic, rooted in the need to protect U.S. interests without engaging in unnecessary conflicts or overextending American resources. This approach does not seek to isolate China or provoke unnecessary confrontation but aims to ensure that China’s influence does not overwhelm global structures, particularly in ways that could undermine U.S. economic strength and political autonomy. At the same time, Colby stresses the importance of clear communication with Beijing, stating that the U.S. should send “clear and credible messages to Beijing that we are not trying to strangle China, that we do not think that Taiwan should be independent, that we do not think that Xi Jinping is Hitler, and yet many of these things are all said, unfortunately.” The United States must make it clear that it is not attempting to stifle China’s growth or advocate for Taiwanese independence, but is instead committed to a stable and balanced international system. 

In his view, achieving this balance will require more than just U.S. efforts in Asia; it also demands that Europe and other U.S. allies take on a greater share of the burden in their own regions. This expectation is not new—it is a concept that dates back to Eisenhower and the Cold War era. Back in the day, both Democratic and Republican administrations pushed allies to contribute more, such as Lyndon Johnson charging West Germany during the balance of payments crisis for hosting U.S. military forces. 

The passage of the Mansfield Amendment further proposed U.S. troop withdrawal unless Europe stepped up its defense efforts. Colby critiques the current state of defense spending in Europe, particularly in allied countries such as Germany, which he believes have grown too reliant on U.S. military support and act more like dependencies than partners. 

He emphasizes that much of the blame lies with the U.S. for fostering this over-reliance after the collapse of the Soviet Union and stresses the necessity of a policy in Washington that actually provides the incentives for European and Asian allies to contribute more to their defense.By encouraging European nations to play their part, the U.S. can focus on the more pressing challenge posed by China without leaving other regions vulnerable. 

The same applies to the Japanese: while one can applaud them for making significant changes to their defense policies in recent years, their pace is still far too leisurely and not nearly enough to face the challenges that a hegemonic China will pose vis-a-vis Taiwan in the foreseeable future.

Ultimately, Colby’s proposed foreign policy reflects a realist outlook, one that prioritizes long-term stability through strength and pragmatic engagement, while avoiding the ideological extremes of isolationism or global hegemony. For further references, Colby’s book A Strategy of Denial is a good read.