NATO in the New World Order: Rose Gottemoeller Visits Dartmouth

On Thursday, April 3, former NATO Deputy Secretary General Rose Gottemoeller visited campus to speak on NATO’s evolving role in the face of Russia’s war on Ukraine. In a wide-ranging conversation with Victoria K. Holt, Director of the Dickey Center for International Understanding, Gottemoeller examined the recent shift in U.S. political dynamics under the second Trump administration and addressed growing concerns among European and Pacific allies about the reliability of U.S. commitments. 

In order to understand the present condition, it is worthwhile to understand why NATO was created in the wake of World War II. After living through the greatest conflict in human history, the European continent had been completely devastated. Furthermore, the victorious Soviet Union had emerged as a superpower and was contesting U.S. postwar leadership in Europe. With the rapid establishment of Soviet satellite states, European postwar leaders became increasingly anxious that the U.S. would again remove itself from the continent (as they had done after WWI) and not face the growing threat that Soviet expansion posed. To prevent communist expansion, the United States needed an economically strong, rearmed, and integrated Europe. As a result, NATO was designed in 1949 with the following motto in mind: “Keep the Soviets out, the Americans in, and the Germans down.”

Throughout the Cold War, the alliance held firm. But NATO’s expansion since the early 2000s was viewed by Russia as an act of strategic encroachment. Over time, Moscow’s resentment has grown, feeding a narrative of Western betrayal and NATO overreach. The post-Cold War order has proven itself to be less stable than many had hoped. With war in Ukraine, the U.S. increasingly pivoting its strategic focus toward the Asia-Pacific, and the recent strain of economic tariffs, NATO allies have grown increasingly uncertain about the alliance’s strategic cohesion. 

According to Gottemoeller, two main sources of tension are beginning to crystallize within the NATO alliance. First, the U.S. is frustrated that NATO member states have fallen behind on burden sharing. Time and again, this issue has been a great source of frustration for the United States, reaching across administrations from JFK to Trump. American leaders have lamented that European allies were not pulling their weight in terms of defense spending and military contributions. Despite repeated commitments – most notably the 2% of GDP pledge made in 2014 – many NATO members have consistently failed to meet these targets. To complicate matters, recent U.S. tariffs have strained relationships even further. According to Gottemoeller, our allies find this duality confusing: is the U.S. a reliable partner in collective defense, or is it primarily negotiating leverage through economic pressure?

Second, there is a growing perception in Europe that the United States is turning its attention elsewhere – shifting strategic forces, intelligence assets, and equipment toward the Asia-Pacific. This has raised unsettling questions among European allies: is the U.S. slowly offloading responsibility for Europe’s conventional defense and expecting Europe to take the lead against Russia? Gottemoeller suggests that while the U.S. will continue to maintain its nuclear deterrent commitment, the broader message to Europe is clear: regional defense against Russia must increasingly become their own burden to carry.

The Greenland question, as Gottemoeller sees it, is less about actual U.S. territorial ambition and more about signaling and strategic positioning. The United States has clear priorities to be present in the arctic and needs to strengthen its airborne warning system (AWACS). But if this really is about US safety, why haven’t they already done it? What is the motive for this theater? There already is a U.S. presence in Greenland, and so the street theater around expanded access – such as Trump’s floated idea of “buying” it and Vice President Vance’s recent visit – serves symbolic and perhaps negotiating purposes. 

In the end, the U.S. is interested in strengthening its Arctic capabilities. And the Danes and Greenlanders seem open to increased cooperation. Gottemoeller speculates that perhaps an agreement will be reached that will grant the U.S. more access to minerals or allow for a new base. But a takeover of Greenland by U.S. troops is nonsense. The deeper issue here is NATO’s atrophy in Arctic readiness. Recent exercises have shown that NATO cannot fight in the arctic any more. With training being halted and Russia building up its capabilities in this domain, it has become very clear that it is time to pay attention to it again.

A very interesting audience question pushed directly at the heart of the matter: What truly motivated Russia’s full-scale assault on Ukraine? Was it really NATO expansion? Or was it something more personal? While Gottemoeller suggested the war was driven by a blend of motives, she did emphasize the central role of Putin’s worldview. NATO expansion may very well have served as the “Anlass,” a pretext in a sense, for Russia’s invasion, but it did not constitute the reason. The real reason might lie in Putin’s personal ambition and ideological drive to reclaim what he sees as the Slavic heartland. NATO is the justification; empire is the objective. Putin’s treatise from summer 2021 laid this out in stark, unsettling terms, denying Ukraine’s legitimacy as a sovereign nation. The West’s failure to react forcefully to Crimea in 2014, Gottemoeller argued, gave him space to escalate.

Russia’s motivations have been interesting because of their shift in stance regarding Ukraine’s EU membership. In 2012, Ukraine’s intention to sign an association agreement with the EU was seen (perhaps implicitly) as a key trigger for Putin’s annexation of Crimea. At the time, Russia proclaimed that preventing Ukraine’s alignment with the EU was a strategic necessity. Today, however, the Kremlin surprisingly claims to be unbothered by Ukraine’s EU ambitions. This is a significant shift in rhetoric and raises questions: If EU alignment once did justify military action, why is it now seemingly acceptable? Gottemoeller suggests that while there is still discomfort with Ukraine integrating into European structures, Moscow is currently not objecting outright to EU membership. The motive could be to perhaps draw a distinction between the EU and NATO, since the argument can be made that Ukraine’s ongoing efforts to meet EU accession standards are simultaneously preparing the country for eventual NATO membership. The processes are deeply intertwined. With that said, permanently closing the door on NATO membership for Ukraine to make any future peace deal work would be detrimental. Putin might demand that the 2008 NATO promise to Ukraine be rescinded. For Gottemoeller, that should be a red line.