The Agency, America, and the World: Former CIA Director John Deutch at Dartmouth

On April 19, Dartmouth played host to a man who knows more about the world than he can ever tell. Former Director of Central Intelligence and Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutch spoke to students at a Dartmouth Political Union (DPU) and Dickey Center for International Understanding event titled “America’s Role on the World Stage.”

The DPU began the event by recounting Deutch’s biography. From the introduction by DPU President William Reicher ’22, the talk promised to be a treat. Reicher’s biography made clear that John Deutch is far more than a wise elder in the national security space. A chemical engineer by training and the former provost of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Deutch is an age-wisened expert on a variety of subjects with the life-story to match.

Originally from Brussels, Deutch immigrated with his parents to the United States. Without knowledge of a single word of English, the future presidential appointee had to learn the language by immersion. Becoming a citizen at age 7, Deutch embarked upon a career in the sciences and eventually in national security, becoming one of three high-ranking officials in the Clinton Administration who was not born in the USA. 

After his introduction, the “talk” began, though the event really took the format of an extended Q&A between Reicher and Deutch.

One particularly fascinating vignette came early on when Deutch recounted how exactly he became Director of Central Intelligence. As Deputy Secretary of Defense, he had been chosen by then-President Clinton to vet candidates for the role. After Deutch’s three recommendations all said no to the offer, Clinton then offered him the job. Waffling, he told the president that he would have to speak with his wife before making a decision. At the peak of his charisma, it was Bubba who called Deutch’s wife first, insisting that Deutch needed to take the position because he was needed and confirmable.

Once he became director, Deutch recounted, he had a responsibility to “overhaul” the organization. Aldrich Ames’ betrayal resulted in the killings of very sensitive American sources in the Soviet Union and Russian Federation and was a “complete failure” of America’s primary foreign-intelligence agency. This disaster resulted in not only a loss of confidence in the organization but also a loss of morale, and Deutch sought to build it back up.

As the event progressed, Reicher pressed Deutch on his record at the helm of the Central Intelligence Agency and, by extension, the Intelligence Community (IC).

On the subject of the Deutch Rule, a policy that Congress later reversed requiring young intelligence officers and station chiefs to get headquarters approval before recruiting sources, Deutch was frank. “I got killed,” he said. Critics of the rule argued that it would stifle intelligence collection from junior officers and weaken the United States’ clandestine intelligence collection capabilities. At the same time, Deutch seemed to deflect blame for this failure, instead blaming his legal counsel for pushing the rule.

Moving onto the subject of foreign security challenges under his tenure, Deutch evinced a similar, yet gruff, frankness. “I’m not going to tell you what I got wrong, there was plenty,” he said. When Reicher asked him about the issue of Islamic fundamentalism, the former director chastised him, saying, “​​What there is is a problem with terrorism. That does not equate necessarily or even at all with Islamic fundamentalism.”

Calling the Rwandan Genocide “my worst mistake,” Deutch also shifted responsibility for the lack of American intervention outside of the IC. “[It was] the worst thing which happened to me while in office,” he said, suggesting that the event was an inevitability while simultaneously lamenting that a force of 200 Marines could have stopped the genocide.

The matter-of-fact appraisal of American national security and foreign policy failures was a common theme of the talk. Asked whether the 2003 Invasion of Iraq was an “intelligence failure,” Deutch responded succinctly that it was “completely inexplicable” and a “catastrophe.”

“It should never have happened…but it did happen,” he said.  In contrast to Iraq, he held up the IC’s warnings of the Russian Invasion of Ukraine as a “unique success,” a symbol of the IC’s “professional success and great performance.”

An especially fascinating moment of the event arose when the moderator questioned him about balancing people’s privacy rights with national security needs. “I like the national security of the United States,” Deutch responded, to slight chuckles. Explaining that current privacy laws do not allow the IC access to US citizens’ phone records, Deutch also gave the audience a disclaimer that he is not an expert on privacy regulations. “Sometimes I think that’s too bad for national security,” he continued, while also clarifying that he does not endorse the collection of information on citizens. He stated his belief, however, that the question should be considered.

When asked about what changes he would make to the IC today, the former Director of Central Intelligence outlined two specific reforms. 

First, he would reorganize the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which was created after 9/11 to replace the Director of Central Intelligence as de facto head of the IC. Although he favored the creation of the position at the time, he now believes it has worked out extremely badly.

Deutch’s second proposed reform called for a change in the political culture of the country more than anything else. The bipartisan intelligence committees in the House of Representatives and Senate, he said, have become “fragmented” by party. Deutch believes that this polarization presents a “significant danger” to proper and responsible oversight over the IC. “Things will not be repaired quickly or seen quickly,” he emphasized.

Ending on this point, the moderated section of the talk transitioned to an audience-driven Q&A.

The most memorable question from this portion of the event came from a transfer student from the American University of Afghanistan. Recounting his four months of hiding from the Taliban and attempted assassination attempts, the student asked whether the American withdrawal from his nation was justified. 

“Is it fair to just betray an ally, a friend, a country, and a whole bunch of millions of Afghans who fought [the] war side-by-side with Americans?” he inquired.

“The word fair is not a word I would use in any way to defend what the United States did,” he responded, “The United States went into Afghanistan to get the people who did the 9/11 attack, then we took on a bigger agenda there…we just couldn’t get it done…we had to make a decision of whether we were going to continue.”

“I’m not sure there’s any strategic interest in Afghanistan…You make a lot of humanitarian points, but what’s the strategic interest?”

Despite Director Deutch’s frequent interruptions of the moderator (The Review counted six times where he publicly took issue with Reicher’s questions or wording), it was refreshing to hear from a national security professional who evaluated American national security in terms of, well, our national security.

John Deutch’s visit to Dartmouth was a welcome opportunity for students to hear about America’s role on the world stage not from some far-removed academic but from a man who has actually shaped, defined, and exercised that role. The DPU, its members, and its leaders deserve kudos for organizing this informative event, and we at The Review look forward to covering many more like it.